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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

Criminal Law: Kidnapping: False Imprisonment: Communication
by Judge to Jury.
In Hackbarthv. State, (Wis.) 229 N.W. 83, a jury found the defendant guilty of having participated in seizing one who was working
as a strikebreaker, carrying him to defendant's farm, where he was
bound and blindfolded, kept in a barn loft for a considerable time,
then taken out, coated with tar, carried into the country, and cast adrift
beside a lonely road. The case record contains, in addition, an admission by the defendant as to his participation therein.
Upon appeal, two questions were considered. The first is: Whether
a count in the information sufficiently stated the crime of kidnapping
under Section 340.54 Wis. Stat. 1927, or, on the contrary, simply stated
the misdemeanor of false imprisonment. The information filed by the
district attorney charged that the defendant "without lawful authority,
forcibly confined another, to-wit, H---- H ___, within this state, and
against his will with intent to cause said H --- H--- to be secretly
confined in this state and against his will, contrary to the form of statute in' such cases made and provided-..." The applicable statute
reads, "Any person who shall.... without.... lawful authority, forcibly seize, confine, inveigle or kidnap another with intent to cause
such person to be secretly confined or imprisoned in this state against
his will.. shall be deemed guilty of a felony-..." Held: that the
allegation of an intent to secretly confine another within the state
against his will establishes the charge of kidnapping, the gist of "kidnapping" as contrasted with "false imprisonment" being the intent to
secretly confine, and the common law requirement of an intent to take
one from within the state being not required by the statute.
The defendant (plaintiff in error on appeal) relied on Smith v.
State, 63 Wis. 453, 23 N..W. 879, as basis for reversal. In that case,
intent to secretly confine was not set forth in the information and upon
that deficiency a judgment finding the defendant guilty of kidnapping
was reversed with directions to regard the information as sufficiently
setting forth merely the charge of false imprisonment. Therein the
Supreme Court explained that false imprisonment becomes kidnapping
only where an intent to carry or send out of the state qualifies or adds
to the act. In the instant case, the appellant found fault with the wording in the information, especially with the use of the words "intent"
and "confine." Claim was made "that in the criminal law the intent
22 Me. 203; Ryland v. Brown (1858) 2 Head 270, Tennessee; Huber v. Grady
(1883) 59 Tex. 502; Merchants National Bank v. Santa Maria Sugar Co. (1914)
220 N.Y. 732, 116 N.E. 106; Morgan v. Farmington Coal & Coke Co.-W. Va.-,
124 S.E. 591.

NOTES AND COMMENT

may be inferred from the act. Consequently, to charge a person with
secretly confining another is sufficient to charge false imprisonment.
Now, if the phrase 'with intent to secretly confine' is added, there is
no change in effect for the reason that the law would presume such an
intent from the act itself. But, if an intent is alleged, different from
what may be presumed from the act itself, the crime increases in
severity, and is given color by such an allegation. The act then becomes merely minor, and the intent becomes the gist of the crime.
In the instant case the intent alleged adds nothing to the act, does not
color it, is no more reprehensible than the act, and is a necessary preceding element of the act. Thus, the second count only alleges false
imprisonment."
In Wisconsin, an information which follows the wording of the statute is sufficient. State v. Duvall, 26 Wis. 415; State v. Welch, 37 Wis.
196; Section 355.33 Wis. Stat. 1927. Thus, where an information
failed to charge the specific statutory offense, that of false imprisonment as a misdemeanor at common law was permitted to stand. Davies
v. State, 72 Wis. 54, 38 N.W. 722. In Montana, where an information
failed to contain the word "secretly" as in the phrase "secretly confined," held nevertheless sufficient to charge kidnapping and support a
conviction for felony. Ex Parte McDonald, 50 Mont. 348, 146 Pac.
942. In Massachusetts, specific intent must be found as a fact to have
existed, and a distinction may be made as to the various members of
a kidnapping band to the extent that the leader, knowing the full purpose, may be chargeable with intent, whereas the hirelings may be
wholly innocent as to the intent in such measure as to merely sustain
false imprisonment. Commonwealth v. Nickerson, 5 Allen (Mass.) 518,
87 Mass. 518. In New York an intent to secretly confine must be
shown, and secrecy must cloak the transaction. People v. Camp, 139
N.Y. 87, 34 N.E. 755. See also: State v. Hoyle, 114 Wash. 290, 194
Pac. 976, a child is not capable of consenting to the kidnapping; People
v. Sheasbey, (Calif.) 255 Pac. 836, in the absence of circumstances
constituting lawful excuse, no intent is necessary other than the intent
to do acts denounced by statute; People v. Fick, 89 Calif. 144, 26 Pac.
759, acts are sufficiently alleged when indictment is in the language of
the statute, and whether "Choy Fong," name of prosecutrix as alleged
in indictment, is idem sonans with "Toy Fong," shown by evidence to
be her true name, held question of fact for jury.
The Wisconsin statutes provide no punishment for the common law
offense of false imprisonment, but the statute on kidnapping seems to
cover it.
The second question considered is: Whether a communication by
the presiding judge to the jury, counsel being absent, informing them
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of the maximum and minimum punishment, was sufficient to constitute prejudicial error. The jurors sent a note by the bailiff, and the
judge likewise sent his answer by note. The jurors were not recalled
to the court room. Held: where the evidence is conclusive as to defendant's guilt, being bolstered by his own admissions, and the primary
basis of appeal is a question of law, the Supreme Court will, in the
exercise of its discretionary powers, declare that the procedure, while
error, is not prejudiced error.
Fundamentally, communications between court and jury should be
free from any suspicion of secrecy. Dishnakerv. Heck, 159 Wis. 572,
577, 150 N.W. 951. If at all, it should be made in open court, in the
presence of counsel. Havenor v. State, 125 Wis. 444, 447, 104 N.W.
116, 117. But where defendant's guilt is so conclusive as to raise only
questions of law upon appeal, and the granting of a new trial for the
error stated "would seem to be almost an affront to good sense," it will
be deemed not prejudicial error. Dishmaker v. Heck, supra.
It is the general rule that such procedure will constitute error, for no
party should be subjected to the burden of an inquiry before the court
aside from the charges.regularly against him. Havenor v. State, supra,
p. 446. That the proceedings of courts be open and public and in the
presence of the parties or their representatives, is subject to strict enforcement, for "parties are not to be put to the burden of showing that
it is in fact injurious.. ." Sargent v. Roberts, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 337.
In another Wisconsin case, the members of the jury asked for the
pleadings and papers in a case, whereupon the judge went to the open
doorway of the jury room and from the threshold told them that he
could not grant their request, but would inform them concerning any
disputed figures or amounts as in evidence, and did so. Upon appeal,
this was declared error, the court upholding Havenor v. State, supra,
and saying, in addition, that "whenever counsel are present or not, if
the jury are to be further instructed they should be brought into the
open court. The rule is strict but salutary. All court proceedings should
be in the open; there should be no opportunity .for the doing of things
in a corner, nor should a defeated party be required to show that such
a communication as was here had was in fact prejudicial ... There is

safety in no other rule." Hurst v. Webster Mfg. Co., 128 Wis. 342,
347, 107 N.W. 666. Sufficiency seems not dependent on its affecting
the jury, nor on being prejudicial, for where the judge stated to the
jury that the sheriff would take them out to supper and that they would
probably agree after further deliberation, the Supreme Court disregarded the immediate harmlessness of the offense in deference to the
decided cases, which were "found to be strong, authoritative and con-
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sistent in treating this as reversible error." Ducate v. Brighton, 133
Wis. 628, 637, 114 N.W. 103.
Variance from the rule expressed in the above cases appears in
Ketchum v. Chgo. etc. R. Co., 150 Wis., 211, 136 N.W. 634, where
jurors requested and obtained from the attending court officer, not the
judge, the measurements of certain railroad cars, the action being denounced as improper, but being regarded as having had no effect upon
the verdict, especially in view of Section 274.37 Wis. Stat., which requires an affirmative showing that error affected substantial rights of
the appellant. The statute referred to provided in part that no judgment shall be reversed or set aside or new trial granted for any error
as to procedure unless the error complained of has affected substantial
rights of the party complaining. The retreat thereby marked from the
strict rule above exemplified met with dissent by Justice Timlin, who
feared the case as precedent and favored the granting of a new trial
due to the misconduct of the jury. Ketchum v. R. Co., 150 Wis. 211,
at pp. 220-222, 136 N.W. 634; see also Sedlack v. State, 141 Wis. 589,
592, 124 N.W. 510.
In cases involving communications of this kind, it is important that
distinction be made between communications had by the court with the
jury, and communications had by the jury with someone other than the
judge. The latter circumstance is open to interpretation as to whether
it constitutes "court procedure" within the meaning of the statute; and
on that basis the cases of Ketchum v. R. Co. and Sedlack v. State may
show a seeming rather than a real deviation from the ruling in Havenor
v. State and the cases cited therewith. At any rate, the instant case,
Hackbarth v. State, is a noteworthy departure in that where the evidence as to guilt is strong, and backed by the defendant's own admissions, it will outweigh a claim of prejudicial error.
RONALD
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Landlord and Tenant: Rental of Premises While Padlocked.
The plaintiffs in this action brought suit for the recovery of rent.
Two' separate leases involving different properties are the contracts
sued on, and are considered in separate actions, both of which are
herein discUssed. Rundle-Spence Mfg. Co. v. Jakopichek, Wis., 229
N.W. 550.
Defendant entered in a written lease for the premises known as No.
86 Second street, beginning July 1, 1924, and ending June 30, 1927,
by the terms of which lease he was to pay an annual rental of $1,200.
Jakopichek subleased the premises to Ignatz Pitzer and Leo Braun
for the entire period for a consideration amounting to $1,200 over and

